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Whose Pregnancy Is It Anyway?
The Intrusion of Abortion-Related Informed Consent Laws and Compelled Medical
Treatment on the Doctor-Pregnant Patient Relationship
Jennifer Jascoll

I. Introduction
In January 2012, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Texas law requiring women
seeking an abortion to have a sonogram, hear a physician’s detailed explanation of it, and listen
to the fetal heartbeat. In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the
Fifth Circuit saw no reason against requiring that the woman be fully informed of her decision
through the provision of this purportedly medically necessary information because “[d]enying
[the woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her ability to decide than
providing the information.”1 The Fifth Circuit concluded that such an informed consent
disclosure is “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information.”2 Yet Texas is not alone in
having such an informed consent law for abortion procedures and, in fact, its law represents a
growing trend among states. As of May 2012, twenty states require abortion providers to
perform ultrasounds and seven of those states require providers to offer the women an
opportunity to view the images.3 Eleven states require verbal or written counseling materials to
include information on ultrasound services.4 There are no state laws requiring informed consent
disclosures to the same invasive and/or graphic degree for other medical procedures.
While the expansion of a state’s ability to regulate abortion through informed consent
statutes has troubling implications, the compelled medical treatment of women who continue
1

Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2012).
667 F.3d at 577.
3
Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, (May 1, 2012),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last visited May 4, 2012). The seven states are
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their pregnancies to term is equally troubling. These are women who refuse, for whatever
reason, to undergo cesarean sections (“c-sections”) or other medical interventions that would, in
their health care providers’ opinion, be in the interest of the fetuses. Such situations arise, for
example, when women refuse to undergo c-sections or induced labor in favor of natural
childbirth, refuse artificial life-sustaining treatment until the fetuses are viable, or choose to
delivery vaginally at home with midwives rather than undergo c-sections at hospitals. In
response, health care providers and family members seek court orders to override the decisions
of these women to benefit the fetuses.
This paper explores how the law treats pregnant women as incapable of making decisions
by infringing on their right to consent to or to refuse medical treatment during their pregnancies.
The Supreme Court recognizes that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.”5 Yet the law does not appear to recognize such a right for pregnant women;
instead, it creates tension over what roles family members, health care providers, legislatures,
and courts have in the women’s reproductive decision-making.
Part II of this paper outlines how the Supreme Court decisions in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart chipped away at pregnant women’s
decision-making capabilities and opened the door for states to enact restrictive abortion-related
informed consent laws.6 Casey and Carhart broadened the constitutional standard – from “strict
scrutiny” in Roe v. Wade to “undue burden” – for reviewing such laws so that “under the undue
burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over
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Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest.”7 Part III outlines four appellate
level court decisions addressing whether pregnant women can refuse to undergo medical
treatment. 8 In those instances, third-parties sought to compel the treatment of pregnant women
who choose to continue their pregnancies but who exercise their right to refuse the treatment
proposed by their health care providers.
Finally, Part IV argues that the law has intruded on the traditional doctor-pregnant patient
relationship by transforming it into a power struggle of competing maternal-fetal-third party
interests during all stages of pregnancy. In Casey the Supreme Court stated that “[a]bortion is a
unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with
the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the
spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist….”9
Now there is room for outsiders to second-guess the decision-making capacity of pregnant
women – as if to say, “is that your final answer?” – and invade the doctor-pregnant patient
relationship. Specifically, many states have adopted informed consent laws that direct the
conversation between doctors and their pregnant patients who seek abortions. Federal appellate
court decisions in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds and
Lakey provide two recent examples.10
This paper concludes that the law is regulating pregnant women’s right to consent to or
refuse medical treatment beyond the traditional notions of compelling state interests in protecting
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505 U.S. at 886; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); In Re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc.,
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505 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
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life. In so doing, the law has intruded on the traditional doctor-pregnant patient relationship and
transformed it into a power struggle of competing maternal-fetal-third party interests.
II. Casey and Carhart: Opening the Door to Restrictive Abortion-Related Informed
Consent Laws and Closing the Door on Pregnant Women’s Decision-Making Capacity
A. Background
Although the Constitution does not expressly provide any right of privacy, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that such a right emanates from the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights
and cannot be invaded “absent a showing of a compelling subordinate state interest.”11 This
right extends to intimate and personal decisions such as marriage, contraception, education, and
child rearing.12 The Constitution also protects “the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”13 That is, until the state demonstrates an
interest in any of the four compelling interests that prevail over the individual right: preserving
life, protecting the interests of third parties, preventing suicide, or maintaining the ethic integrity
of the medical profession so compelling that it overrides the right of the individual.14
In Roe, the Court recognized the state’s interest in protecting the life of a fetus and
identified viability as the “compelling point” permitting state intervention.15 Until that point was
reached, “the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, [was] free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated.”16 Twenty years later, however, that compelling point began to disappear and state
informed consent laws began to prevail over the individual right. Even though it affirmed the
11

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965).
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, Inc., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
13
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
14
Superintendent of Blechertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
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410 U.S. at 113.
16
Id. at 163.
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central holdings of Roe, the Court established in Casey that “the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus
that may become a child.”17 With Carhart the compelling point disappeared in favor of the
state’s interest.18
B. Casey and Carhart
In Casey, the Court started to chip away at the Roe “compelling point” framework and
strict scrutiny standard of review governing abortion regulations. 19 The State could “enact rules
and regulations designed to encourage [the pregnant woman] to know that there are
philosophical and social arguments of great weight” for continuing the pregnancy.20 The preand post-viability distinction no longer applied. States could express their preference for life by
regulating pre-viability abortions if the restrictions did not impose an “undue burden” on the
women’s right to access the procedure.21 The Court ambiguously described the undue burden
standard as “shorthand for the conclusion that the state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”22
Requiring informed consent disclosures of state-produced materials and warnings provided states
with a means to express their preference for life. So long as the disclosed information was
“truthful and not misleading” then it was relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.23
In Casey, the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 32033220, required that a pregnant woman give her informed consent prior to undergoing an abortion
procedure, receive State-published materials at least 24 hours prior to the procedure, and undergo
17

505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added).
550 U.S. at 135.
19
505 U.S. at 872-73 (stating that the trimester framework is flawed because it “misconceives the nature of the
pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life” as stated in Roe).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 878-79.
22
Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
23
Id. at 882.
18
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a mandatory 24-hour waiting period.24 The materials included the health risks of abortion and
childbirth as well as the “probable gestational age of the unborn child.”25 The woman had to
confirm in writing that she received this information and was made aware of printed materials
“describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth,
information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption
and other services as alternatives to abortion.”26 The woman also had to confirm spousal
notification barring any medical emergencies.27
Planned Parenthood challenged the Act for violating abortion providers’ First
Amendment rights not to provide risk information in a manner proscribed by the state.28 The
Court rejected this argument as the providers’ First Amendment rights “[were] implicated but
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State.”29 That reasonable licensing and regulation extended to the health and safety of a woman
seeking an abortion as it did for other medical procedures.30 Thus the Court viewed the real
constitutional issue as concerning “whether the State can resolve these philosophical questions in
such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter” except for instances of rape,
incest, or medical emergency.31 The Court believed that “under the undue burden standard a
State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if
those measures do not further a health interest.”32

24

Id. at 881.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. The Act also imposed certain reporting requirements on abortion providers.
28
Id. at 884.
29
Id. (internal citation omitted).
30
Id. at 878.
31
Id. at 851.
32
Id. at 886.
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In this way Casey assumed that women lack the capacity to make medical treatment
decisions. Gone were the days of Roe when health care providers could use their medical
judgment, free from state regulation, to assist pregnant women.33 Gone were the days of private
conversation between doctor and pregnant patient. Abortion was now “a unique act…. fraught
with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her
decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and
society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist….”34 The Court now
framed abortion as an act involving multiple third-parties with claims in the decision-making
process. Informed consent disclosures were necessary to “reduc[e] the risk that a woman may
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed.”35
Fifteen years later, Carhart provided the Court with an opportunity to affirm Casey and
prop wide open the door for states to expand their abortion-related informed consent laws.
There the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2000 (“PBABA”) banning the
intact “dilation and evacuation” technique most often used during the second trimester.36 The
Court reiterated that the government “has a significant role to play in regulating the medical
profession” and that “[t]he government may use its voice and regulatory authority to show its
profound respect for the life within the woman.”37 The State has a legitimate interest in ensuring
that the pregnant woman understands the exact nature of the procedure.38 PBABA did not

33

410 U.S. at 163.
505 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
35
Id. at 882.
36
550 U.S. at 135.
37
Id. at 128.
38
Id. at 159.
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impose an undue burden because it furthered legitimate government interests in protecting the
life of a fetus and the emotional well-being of a pregnant woman.39
Thus the Carhart decision permitted states to regulate the conversation between health
care providers and their pregnant patients. The Court noted acknowledged that
[i]n a decision fraught with emotional consequences some doctors may prefer not
to disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining themselves to
the required statement of risks the procedure entails…. Any number of patients
facing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all the details, lest
the usual anxiety preceding invasive medical procedures become the more
intense.
[…]
It is, however, this lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus will
be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State….40
In this way the Court recognized that such regulation went beyond what health care providers
were inclined – or legally required – to disclose to their patients. Other medical procedures did
not require the same invasive and/or graphic degree of detail. Yet the parties outside of the
doctor-patient relationship seemed to matter most because “[t]he State’s interest in respect for
life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical
profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a
decision to elect a late-term abortion.”41
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, the majority’s reasoning
against the necessity of a health exception contradicted its earlier reasoning in Casey.42 In Casey
proponents of the PA Act argued that the spousal notification provision was not an undue burden

39

Id.
Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
41
Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
42
Id. at 188-89 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
40
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for almost 99 percent of women seeking abortions.43 The Court rejected this argument and stated
that the proper constitutional analysis should review the group affected by the statute, not the
unaffected group.44 Such an analysis revealed instances where spousal notification could lead to
domestic violence. The Court reasoned that the existence of this possibility, however small in
likelihood and however small the percentage of affected women, presented enough of a
substantial obstacle and an undue burden to render the spousal notification provision
unconstitutional.45
In contrast, the Carhart Court found that PBABA survived review because its opponents
failed to show that the ban on intact D&E unduly burdened a “large fraction of relevant cases.”46
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that a “large fraction” was not the requisite determinant as
established by Casey. Instead, the provision “‘must be judged by reference to those [women] for
whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction…. The very purpose of a health
exception is to protect women in exceptional cases’”47
The Carhart Court also adopted a paternalistic tone when it observed that “[i]t is selfevident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learned, only after the event, what she did not
know” in so far as the nature of the procedure.48 The Court noted that the Act also protected the
health of the mother given the medical uncertainty as to the health risks of the procedure.49
Justice Ginsburg challenged this tone in her dissent when she noted that “[t]he solution the Court
approves… is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different
43

505 U.S. at 894.
Id. at 894.
45
Id. at 894-95.
46
550 U.S. at 167-68.
47
Id. at 188 (emphasis in original).
48
Id. at 158.
49
Id. at 161.
44
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procedures and their attendant risks…. Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make
an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”50
III. Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment and the Powers That Compel Them
While the expansion of a state’s ability to regulate abortion through informed consent
statutes has troubling implications, the compelled medical treatment of women who continue
their pregnancies to term is equally troubling. A competent adult generally may refuse medical
treatment as “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body….”51 This refusal can even apply in instances where treatment
may prolong or save a person’s life.52 Yet the right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute
for pregnant women, specifically with respect to c-sections. These situations arise, for example,
when women refuse to undergo c-sections or induced labor in favor of natural childbirth, refuse
artificial life-sustaining treatment until the fetuses are viable, or choose to delivery vaginally at
home with midwives rather than undergo c-sections at hospitals Interestingly enough, c-sections
accounted for 32.7% of all U.S. births in 2009.53 Less than 1% of pregnant women opt for a
birth outside of a hospital.54 Most of this small minority uses a midwife birth attendant. In 2009,
20,489 of the 4.13 million U.S. births were attended by a midwife at home or a freestanding birth
center.55

50

Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment….”); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is the prerogative
of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie.”).
52
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-65 (N.J. 1976).
53
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics. VitalStats. “Method of Delivery
(Cesarean and Vaginal Births), 2009,” http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm. [last accessed May 5, 2012].
According to government statistics, c-sections accounted for 1,353,572 out of 4,130,665 births.
54
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics. VitalStats. “BFACIL by
ATTEND (2009 Birth Data – State Detail),” http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm. [last accessed May 5, 2012]
55
Id.
51
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In such situations, health care providers and family members seek court orders to
override the decisions of these women to benefit the fetuses. The following appellate cases
illustrate how courts have acquiesced to or rejected such requests.
I. Four Appellate Cases on the Right (or Lack Thereof) to Refuse C-Sections
The Supreme Court of Georgia ordered that a pregnant woman undergo a c-section in
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority.56 There Jessie Mae Jefferson went to
the hospital for pre-natal care during her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy.57 The doctor informed
Ms. Jefferson that she had a complete placenta previa which required a c-section to preserve the
life of the fetus and her own life.58 She refused to undergo the c-section, as well as blood
transfusions, for religious reasons.59 The hospital sought a court ruling as to whether the fetus
had any legal right to the protection of the court.60
The Georgia Supreme Court found that George statute criminalized abortion and thus the
state had a duty to protect the fetus.61 This state duty outweighed any refusal made by Ms.
Jefferson.62 The court concluded that the lives of the mother and fetus were “inseparable” and
thus it was “appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it [was] necessary
to give the child an opportunity to live.”63 Thus the court ordered Ms. Jefferson to undergo a csection despite her refusal.64

56

274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
Id. at 458.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 460.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 458.
64
Id. at 460.
57
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The Illinois Appellate Court arrived at a different conclusion in In Re Baby Boy Doe.65
That case concerned “Doe,” a “mentally competent” married woman who received regular
prenatal care at a Chicago hospital.66 Dr. James Meserow, a board-certified
obstetrician/gynecologist affiliated with the hospital, examined Doe during her 35th week of
pregnancy and recommended an immediate c-section or induced labor.67 Doe refused on
religious grounds and chose to proceed with natural childbirth.68 Two weeks later, Doe revisited
the doctor and again refused the procedure (along with her husband) on religious grounds.69 Dr.
Meserow and the hospital filed a petition seeking an appointed custodian for the fetus.70 The
trial court denied the petition.71 Doe vaginally delivered a healthy baby boy a few weeks later.72
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the rights of a viable fetus should be
balanced against the rights of a competent pregnant woman who refuses medical treatment as
invasive as a c-section “even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.”73
The appellate court found that Illinois common law protected the right of a competent individual
to refuse medical treatment, including life saving or life sustaining procedures, even on religious
grounds.74 The state right of privacy also protected the rights to reproductive autonomy and
bodily integrity.75 The court could not countenance issuing an order whose “[e]nforcement could
be accomplished only through physical force or its equivalent” and would require having the
65

632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 327.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 328.
72
Id. at 329.
73
Id. at 326.
74
Id. at 330.
75
Id. at 331 (citing Family Life League v. Dep’t of Public Aid, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. 1986) and Stallman v.
Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)). The court also drew upon Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
Cruzan where she stated that “[b]ecause our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests
protected by the Due Process Clause.” 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
66
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mother “fastened with restraints to the operating table, or perhaps rendered unconscious by
forcibly injecting her with anesthetic, and then subject[ing her] to unwanted major surgery.”76
The rights of the competent pregnant woman prevailed.77
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals similarly concluded in In re A.C. that the
rights of a fetus did not trump those rights of an individual (i.e., a pregnant woman) who had
already been born.78 In that case, “A.C.” was a 27 year old married pregnant woman in
remission from cancer.79 Due to her medical history of multiple surgeries and cancer treatment,
A.C. was referred to the high-risk pregnancy clinic at George Washington University Hospital.80
The Hospital discovered an inoperable tumor in her right lung during the 25th week of
pregnancy.81 A.C. initially indicated that she wanted to have the baby.82 When the doctors
informed her that the illness was terminal, A.C. agreed to palliative treatment to sustain her life
until the 28th week of pregnancy.83 However, the following morning A.C. was ambiguous as to
whether she still wanted to have the baby, saying “something to the effect of ‘I don’t know, I
think so.’”84
The Hospital filed for a declaratory judgment to deliver the fetus by c-section before 28
weeks.85 The trial court used a balancing test to weigh the state’s interest in surgical intervention
against A.C’s perceived interest in not having the c-section performed. The trial court found that
(1) A.C. would die within 48 hours, (2) she was pregnant with a viable fetus who had a 50 to 60
percent chance of survival if a c-section was performed, (3) the state had an “important and
76

Id. at 335 (quoting In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244 n. 8).
Id. at 330-31.
78
573 A.2d at 1244.
79
Id. at 1238.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1239.
85
Id.
77
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legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,” and (4) the surgery would hasten
the death of A.C. but its delay would increase the risk of death for the fetus.86 In balancing these
interests, the trial court ordered the c-section even though it was “of the view that it does not
clearly know what [A.C.’s] present views are with respect to the issue of whether or not the child
should live or die. She’s presently unconscious….”87 The decision was relayed to A.C. when
she regained consciousness, but it was unclear whether she consented to the procedure.88 The
trial court reconvened later that day and again ordered that a c-section be performed even though
it still could not determine her intent.89
The appellate court addressed two issues: (1) who had the right to decide the course of
medical treatment for a dying patient who was pregnant with a viable fetus, and (2) how should a
court proceed when a pregnant patient was incapable of making an informed decision as to a
course of medical treatment for herself and her fetus.90 The court began its analysis by
expressing the “tenet common to all medical treatment cases: that any person has the right to
make an informed choice, if competent to do so, to accept or forego medical treatment.”91 This
doctrine of informed consent was based on an individual’s right to bodily integrity whereby
“courts do not compel one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her bodily
integrity for the benefit of another person’s health.”92 While such a right was not absolute in the
face of the four widely-recognized countervailing state interests, there had to be a compelling

86

Id. at 1240.
Id.
88
Id. When the trial court reconvened to determine whether A.C. had consented to the c-section, Dr. Weingold
testified that she “very clearly mouthed words several times, I don’t want it done. I don’t want it done.” Id. at 1241
(emphasis in original).
89
Id. at 1241.
90
Id. at 1238.
91
Id. at 1243.
92
Id.
87
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justification for overriding a competent individual’s right to refuse medical treatment.93 The
court concluded that there was none as the rights of a fetus did not trump the rights of an
individual who had already been born.94 The court rejected the idea that pregnant women should
be held to a different standard due to their pregnancies and quickly dismissed any possible state
interest.95 Furthermore, the appellate court found that the trial court should have used the
substituted judgment standard, rather than the balancing test, in order to ascertain what A.C.
would have done if she had been capable of making an informed decision.96
The appellate court also briefly reflected on the “practical consequences” of enforcing a
court-ordered c-section.97 If A.C. had refused to follow the court order then how might the court
have forced her compliance? Clearly imprisonment or a daily fine would not be effective. 98 The
only possible means to ensure compliance would be through
physical force or its equivalent. A.C. would have to be fastened with restrains
to the operating table, or perhaps involuntarily rendered unconscious by
forcibly injecting her with an anesthetic, and then subjected to unwanted
major surgery. Such actions would surely give one pause in a civilized
society, especially when A.C. had done no wrong.99
Yet this is not unlike the means of enforcement that an appellate court permitted nine years later
in Florida.
In Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., the District Court
for the Northern District of Florida concluded that a competent pregnant woman was legally
93

Id. at 1245-46. The appellate court noted that “[w]e do not quite foreclose the possibility that a conflicting state
interest may be so compelling that the patient’s wishes must yield, but we anticipate that such cases will be
extremely rare and truly exceptional. This is not such a case.” Id.
94
Id. at 1244.
95
Id. at 1243-44.
96
Id. at 1252. The appellate court also noted that “[w]henever possible, the judge should personally attempt to
speak with the patient and ascertain her wishes directly, rather than relying exclusively on hearsay evidence, even
from doctors. It is improper to presume that patient is incompetent. Id. at 1247. While this is a laudable approach,
one has to wonder by what means the court imagined such an inquiry might take place, given the time-sensitive
nature of such a situation and/or the unavailability of a patient due to hospitalization.
97
Id. at 1244 n. 8.
98
Id.
99
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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required to undergo a c-section because it “was medically necessary in order to avoid a
substantial risk that her baby would die during delivery.”100 Laura Pemberton wanted to
vaginally deliver her second child.101 Ms. Pemberton could not find a physician who would
perform such a delivery because she posed an increased risk of uterine rupture from a prior csection.102 So she chose to have a vaginal delivery at home with a midwife.103
After more than a day of labor, Ms. Pemberton became dehydrated and went to the
emergency room at Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center for fluids.104 Dr. Wendy
Thompson, a board-certified family practice physician, declined to provide fluids and advised
Ms. Pemberton that she needed a c-section.105 Ms. Pemberton refused to undergo the procedure
and left the Hospital.106 The Hospital sought a court order to compel the c-section and requested
a hearing. The judge convened a hearing at the Hospital and sent a law enforcement officer to
fetch Ms. Pemberton “by ambulance against her will.”107 After hearing testimony from several
doctors that a vaginal birth would pose a substantial risk of uterine rupture and death of the baby,
the judge ordered that a c-section be performed.108
Ms. Pemberton sued the Hospital for violating her substantive constitutional right of
bodily integrity, right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and right to make important
decisions “regarding the bearing of children without undue governmental interference.”109
The District Court recognized Ms. Pemberton’s “constitutional interests” but concluded that they
did not outweigh the state’s interest “in preserving the life of the unborn child.”110 The court
100

66 F.Supp.2d at 1248-49.
Id. at 1249.
102
Id.
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relied upon Roe’s recognition that “by the point of viability – roughly the third trimester of
pregnancy – the state’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus outweighs the mother’s own
constitutional interests in determining whether she will bear a child.”111 The court pointed to the
fact that no doctor was willing to attempt vaginal delivery at home or at the Hospital as a safety
consideration falling under the auspices of the state’s interests.112 Therefore, the state’s interest
in the life of the fetus outweighed Ms. Pemberton’s interest in her right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.113
IV. The Intrusion of Abortion-Related Informed Consent Laws and Compelled Medical
Treatment on the Doctor-Pregnant Patient Relationship
In Canterbury v. Spence, the patient sought damages for personal injuries allegedly
sustained as a result of an operation negligently performed, a negligent failure to disclose a risk
of serious disability inherent in the operation, and negligent post-operative care.114 The court
found that the patient and his mother made out a prima facie case that the physician violated his
duty to disclose the risk of paralysis from the operation. There the Court found that
the test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its
materiality to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision
must be unmasked… to safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving his own
determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate
disclosure.115
Judge Robinson suggested that the standard is the uniform application of the negligence principle
to medical practice. However, the negligence principle normally evaluates the conduct of a
reasonable actor and not the expectations of a reasonable victim. Ironic that a doctrine
developed to foster and recognize individual choice is measured by an objective standard.
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The informed consent doctrine functions to, among other things, protect individual
autonomy, encourage doctors to carefully consider their decisions, avoid fraud and duress, and
foster rational decision-making by the patient. It rests on the assumption that the health care
provider has greater knowledge than the patient and a required information exchange best
protects the patient. At the same time, it includes the patient in the decision-making process.
For example, The Joint Commission (TJC) requires hospitals to inform their patients that
they “have the right to make decisions about [their] care, including refusing care” and have “the
right to be listened to.”116 TJC defines informed consent as “your health care providers have
talked to you about your treatment and its risks. They have also talked to you about options to
treatment and what can happen if you aren’t treated.”117 The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) outlines the standards of care for hospitals participating in Medicare and/or
Medicaid. Specifically, HHS requires providers to recognize the patients to “request or refuse
treatment.”118 The American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) have noted that the standard of informed consent applies to women
throughout all stages of their pregnancies. The ACOG Committee on Ethics has explained that
“[p]regnancy does not obviate or limit the requirement to obtain informed consent. Intervention
on behalf of the fetus must be undertaken through the body and within the context of the life of
the pregnant woman, and therefore her consent for medical treatment is required, regardless of
the treatment indication.”119
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Nadia Sawicki provides a thoughtful analysis of the expansion of state abortion informed
consent statutes.120 She posits informed consent as a more nuanced, flexible and value-laden
doctrine than the overly simplistic, static and neutral doctrine put forward by critics.121
Specifically, Sawicki “calls into question the feasibility of a doctrine of informed consent that
aspires to complete neutrality” and notes that “it is questionable whether even the most stringent
procedures for assuring such neutrality can effectively be shielded from political and personal
agendas.”122 Yet the courts have adopted informed consent as the measuring stick by which the
regulation of abortion is expanded and restricted. Judicial intervention on the basis of informed
consent renders nearly every decision a pregnant woman makes subject to scrutiny by her
doctors and the courts.
In Casey and Gonzales the Supreme Court established that a state may require that
physicians provide truthful, non-misleading information “relevant” to a woman’s decision to
have an abortion.123 Such informed consent disclosures are permissible even when the
information expresses a preference for life so long as it does not impose a substantial obstacle or
an undue burden.124 The Casey decision vaguely described what constitutes a “substantial
obstacle,” stating that “[r]egulations that do no more than create a structural mechanism by
which the State… may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted.” It
remains unclear how a state might express “profound respect” for life through a “structural
mechanism” that does not pose a substantial obstacle to pregnant women.125
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Many states have taken Casey's lead by adopting structural mechanisms in the form of
informed consent laws that direct the conversations between doctors and their pregnant patients
prior to or at the time when abortions are performed.126 Two recent federal circuit cases
highlight how First Amendment and undue burden challenges fail unless the disclosure is
untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant to the woman’s decision.
In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, the Eighth
Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction of a South Dakota statue, S.D.C.L. § 42-23A-10.01,
requiring that (1) a woman seeking an abortion receive certain information materials, (2) she
give written informed consent prior to the procedure, and (3) the attending physician certify that
she understands the information.127 The information materials included a statement informing
the woman
… (b) That the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being;
(c) That the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human
being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States
Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota;
(d) That by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing
constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated;
(e) A description of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically
significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would be subjected….128
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In addition, the statute required that a woman receive information about medical assistance
benefits for bringing the pregnancy to term at least 24 hours prior to the abortion.129 A physician
who knowingly or recklessly failed to provide this information would be guilty of a
misdemeanor.130 Medical emergencies were the only exception to the statute.131
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota, along with its medical
director Dr. Carole E. Ball, challenged the statute for, among other things, violating physicians’
free speech rights “by compelling them to deliver the State’s ideological message” and unduly
burdening patients’ right to an abortion due to an inadequate health exception.132 The Eighth
Circuit found that the statute was not facially unconstitutional as it did not prevent a woman from
having an abortion nor did it compel doctors to engage in ideological speech.133 Drawing upon
Casey and Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “[w]hile the State cannot compel an
individual simply to speak the State's ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to
require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s
decision to have an abortion….”134
In her dissent, Circuit Judge Diana Murphy compared the South Dakota informed consent
provisions to other state laws consistent with Casey.135 Circuit Judge Murphy found that the
South Dakota provisions required physicians to make “unique statements… unrelated to the
intended medical procedure” on “metaphysical matters about which there is no medical
129
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consensus.”136 Unlike the provisions of other informed consent statutes, the South Dakota
statements contained ideological beliefs rather than medically relevant information.137
Furthermore, the requirement that the physician-patient discussion be written down and included
in the patient’s medical record intruded upon the doctor-patient relationship.138
Recently in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the Fifth
Circuit upheld Texas House Bill 15, codified in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012, “relating
to informed consent to an abortion.”139 H.B. 15 amends the 2003 Texas Woman’s Right to
Know Act and requires a doctor to perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, play the
heartbeat of the fetus, explain to the pregnant woman the results of each procedure, and then wait
24 hours between the disclosures and performing the abortion.140 The woman may decline to
view the sonogram or hear the heartbeat, but she cannot decline to hear an explanation of the
sonogram unless she qualifies for one of the three statutory exceptions.141 She also must
complete a form stating that she has received these materials, understands her right to view the
sonogram and hear the heartbeat, and chooses to have an abortion.142 The doctor must retain a
copy of this form for seven years.143 If the woman does not have an abortion, the doctor must
provide her with information on establishing paternity and securing child support.144 The
plaintiff abortion providers challenged the statute for as violating the First Amendment and
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compelling them to impart an “ideological message” that discourages women to have an abortion
rather than serves a medical purpose.145
The Fifth Circuit drew upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and Gonzales to
find that informed consent laws do not impose an undue burden if they require “truthful,”
“nonmisleading,” and “relevant disclosures.”146 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that reasonable state
regulation of medical practice is not tantamount to compelling ideological speech in violation of
the First Amendment.147 Instead, the informed consent ensures that a woman understands the
consequences of an abortion.148 That the woman might then decide not to have an abortion does
not render the Act invalid.149 The court also found the required written consent acceptable as
well since it is obtained for other medical procedures.150
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ objections to the provision of sonograms and
the fetal heartbeat and found that they were “medically necessary.”151 Just as the Casey decision
was vague as to what qualifies as a “substantial obstacle” in an undue burden, the Lakey court
was vague as to how information about the development of the fetus is medically relevant. The
Lakey court believed that withholding current medical information was “more of an abuse of [the
woman’s] ability to decide than providing the information.”152 The court points to the “gravity
of the decision” as requiring informed consent and the provision of relevant medical
information.153 Yet how is it not a substantial obstacle or an undue burden when the Lakey court
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acknowledges that “discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures”?154
Lakey is distinguishable from Casey in that it interferes with the doctor-patient
relationship. In Casey, the Court acknowledged that “constitutional right of privacy between a
pregnant woman and her physician.”155 The Casey statute contained a provision that a physician
need not comply if he or she could reasonably believed that giving the information would
adversely effect the physical or mental health of the patient.156 Thus a physician could exercise
his medical judgment.157
The provision of “truthful,” “nonmisleading,” and “relevant disclosures” comes into play
both with Lakey and Rounds. Courts are willing to uphold the statute provided that the medical
information is sound and no different from what might be disclosed for other medical
procedures. Contrast the Lakey statute with the Iowa informed consent statute. Pursuant to Iowa
Code § 147.137 (1975), informed consent consists of a consent in writing which
1. Sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or
procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of death, brain damage,
quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or
disfiguring scars associated with such procedure or procedures, with the
probability of each such risk if reasonably determinable.
2. Acknowledges that the disclosure of that information has been made and that
all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in a
satisfactory manner.
3. Is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is to be performed, or if the
patient for any reason lacks legal capacity to consent, is signed by a person who
has legal authority to consent on behalf of that patient in those circumstances.158
In contrast, the Lakey statute provides that informed consent to an abortion occurs only when the
physician provides the following “medical” information to the pregnant woman, including
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(A) the physician's name;
(B) the particular medical risks associated with the particular abortion procedure
to be employed, including, when medically accurate:
(i) the risks of infection and hemorrhage;
(ii) the potential danger to a subsequent pregnancy and of infertility; and
(iii) the possibility of increased risk of breast cancer following an induced
abortion and the natural protective effect of a completed pregnancy in
avoiding breast cancer;
(C) the probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to
be performed; and
(D) the medical risks associated with carrying the child to term….159
One has to wonder how Justice Ginsburg would rule in the instance of Lakey as the statute
pertains to informed consent. As previously noted, in her Gonzales dissent Justice Ginsburg was
concerned that the Supreme Court had prevented women from making a choice as to what
procedure they underwent.160 In Lakey, the statute does not prevent women from making a
choice as to medical treatment but instead compels doctors to inform them of the consequences
of the abortion procedure.
V. Conclusion
According to the Guttmacher Institute, states enacted a record number of reproductive
health and rights-related provisions in 2011.161 In March 2012, an Oklahoma state judge issued a
permanent injunction preventing the enforcement of a similar mandatory ultrasound and detailed
descriptions law, finding that “it improperly is addressed only to patients, physicians and
sonographers concerning abortions and does not address all patients, physicians and
sonographers concerning other medical care where a general law could clearly be made
applicable.”162 That same month the Virginia legislature approved a law requiring a woman
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seeking an abortion to undergo an ultrasound at least 24 hours prior to the procedure, be given an
opportunity to see the image, and have the abortion provider keep a copy of the image in the
woman’s medical record for seven years.163 The original version of the law would have required
women to undergo transvaginal sonograms if the ultrasound failed to determine the age of the
fetus.164 As of May 2012, seven states require abortion providers to perform ultrasounds and
offer the women an opportunity to view the images.165
Yet there are no laws requiring informed consent disclosures of the same invasive and/or
graphic degree for other medical procedures. The law is regulating pregnant women’s right to
consent to or refuse medical treatment beyond the traditional notions of compelling state
interests in protecting life. In so doing, the law has intruded on the traditional doctor-pregnant
patient relationship and transformed it into a power struggle of competing maternal-fetal-third
party interests.
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